Estimated DREAD ratings for the other attack vectors (need review)
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@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ and priority scores are calculated using the equations outlined
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<h3 id="bruteforce">{% trans %}Brute force attacks{% endtrans %}</h3>
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{{ DREAD_score(1, 1, 1, 1, 3) }}
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{{ DREAD_score(2, 1, 1, 1, 3) }}
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<p>{% trans -%}
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A brute force attack can be mounted by a global passive or active adversary,
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@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ References: <a href="{{ pdf }}">Low-Resource Routing Attacks Against Anonymous S
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<h3 id="intersection">{% trans %}Intersection attacks{% endtrans %}</h3>
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{{ DREAD_score(1, 1, 1, 1, 1) }}
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{{ DREAD_score(3, 2, 2, 3, 3) }}
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<p>{% trans -%}
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Intersection attacks against low latency systems are extremely powerful -
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@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ There are a whole slew of denial of service attacks available against I2P,
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each with different costs and consequences:
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{%- endtrans %}</p>
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{{ DREAD_score(1, 1, 1, 1, 1) }}
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{{ DREAD_score(1, 1, 2, 1, 3) }}
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<p>{% trans -%}
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<b>Greedy user attack:</b> This is simply
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people trying to consume significantly more resources than they are
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@@ -389,7 +389,7 @@ Maintain a strong community with blogs, forums, IRC, and other means of communic
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</ul>
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<div style="clear:both"></div>
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{{ DREAD_score(1, 1, 1, 1, 1) }}
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{{ DREAD_score(2, 1, 1, 2, 3) }}
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<p>{% trans peerselection=site_url('docs/how/peer-selection') -%}
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<b>Starvation attack:</b> A hostile user may attempt to harm the network by
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creating a significant number of peers in the network who are not identified as
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@@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ significant efforts required in this area.
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{%- endtrans %}</p>
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<div style="clear:both"></div>
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{{ DREAD_score(1, 1, 1, 1, 1) }}
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{{ DREAD_score(1, 2, 2, 2, 3) }}
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<p>{% trans todo=site_url('get-involved/todo') -%}
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<b>Flooding attack:</b> A hostile user may attempt to flood the network,
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a peer, a destination, or a tunnel. Network and peer flooding is possible,
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@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ bugs in the implementation.
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{%- endtrans %}</p>
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<div style="clear:both"></div>
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{{ DREAD_score(1, 1, 1, 1, 1) }}
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{{ DREAD_score(2, 2, 3, 2, 3) }}
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<p id="ffdos">{% trans peerselection=site_url('docs/how/peer-selection'),
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netdb=site_url('docs/how/network-database') -%}
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<b>Floodfill DOS attack:</b> A hostile user may attempt to harm the network by
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@@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ as the links are encrypted and messages signed.
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<h3 id="partitioning">{% trans %}Partitioning attacks{% endtrans %}</h3>
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{{ DREAD_score(1, 1, 1, 1, 1) }}
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{{ DREAD_score(3, 1, 1, 1, 2) }}
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<p>{% trans -%}
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Partitioning attacks - finding ways to segregate (technically or analytically)
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@@ -517,7 +517,7 @@ Also discussed on the <a href="{{ netdb }}#threat">network database page</a> (bo
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<h3 id="predecessor">{% trans %}Predecessor attacks{% endtrans %}</h3>
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{{ DREAD_score(1, 1, 1, 1, 1) }}
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{{ DREAD_score(1, 1, 1, 1, 3) }}
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<p>{% trans -%}
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The predecessor attack is passively gathering statistics in an attempt to see
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@@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ which is an update to the 2004 predecessor attack paper
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<h3 id="harvesting">{% trans %}Harvesting attacks{% endtrans %}</h3>
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{{ DREAD_score(1, 1, 1, 1, 1) }}
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{{ DREAD_score(1, 1, 2, 2, 3) }}
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<p>{% trans -%}
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"Harvesting" means compiling a list of users running I2P.
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@@ -609,7 +609,7 @@ enact other restricted route methods.
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<h3 id="traffic">{% trans %}Identification Through Traffic Analysis{% endtrans %}</h3>
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{{ DREAD_score(1, 1, 1, 1, 1) }}
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{{ DREAD_score(1, 1, 2, 3, 3) }}
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<p>{% trans transport=site_url('docs/transport') -%}
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By inspecting the traffic into and out of a router, a malicious ISP
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@@ -669,7 +669,7 @@ Reference: <a href="{{ pdf }}">Breaking and Improving Protocol Obfuscation</a>
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<h3 id="sybil">{% trans %}Sybil attacks{% endtrans %}</h3>
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{{ DREAD_score(1, 1, 1, 1, 1) }}
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{{ DREAD_score(3, 2, 1, 3, 3) }}
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<p>{% trans -%}
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Sybil describes a category of attacks where the adversary creates arbitrarily
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@@ -718,7 +718,7 @@ for more Sybil discussion.
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<h3 id="buddy">{% trans %}Buddy Exhaustion attacks{% endtrans %}</h3>
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{{ DREAD_score(1, 1, 1, 1, 1) }}
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{{ DREAD_score(3, 2, 2, 1, 3) }}
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<p>{% trans pdf='http://www.eecs.berkeley.edu/~pmittal/publications/nisan-torsk-ccs10.pdf' -%}
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(Reference: <a href="{{ pdf }}">In Search of an Anonymouns and Secure Lookup</a> Section 5.2)
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@@ -743,7 +743,7 @@ Further research and defenses may be necessary.
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<h3 id="crypto">{% trans %}Cryptographic attacks{% endtrans %}</h3>
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{{ DREAD_score(1, 1, 1, 1, 1) }}
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{{ DREAD_score(3, 2, 1, 3, 1) }}
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<p>{% trans cryptography=site_url('docs/how/cryptography') -%}
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We use strong cryptography with long keys, and
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@@ -785,7 +785,7 @@ end to end messages include simple random padding.
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<h3 id="floodfill">{% trans %}Floodfill Anonymity attacks{% endtrans %}</h3>
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{{ DREAD_score(1, 1, 1, 1, 1) }}
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{{ DREAD_score(3, 2, 1, 2, 2) }}
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<p>{% trans netdb=site_url('docs/how/network-database') -%}
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In addition to the floodfill DOS attacks described
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@@ -815,7 +815,7 @@ Several scenarios are discussed on the
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<h3 id="central">{% trans %}Central Resource Attacks{% endtrans %}</h3>
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{{ DREAD_score(1, 1, 1, 1, 1) }}
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{{ DREAD_score(1, 1, 1, 3, 3) }}
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<p>{% trans -%}
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There are a few centralized or limited resources (some inside I2P, some not)
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@@ -870,7 +870,7 @@ and would shrink the network (in the short-to-medium term), just as the loss of
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<h3 id="dev">{% trans %}Development attacks{% endtrans %}</h3>
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{{ DREAD_score(1, 1, 1, 1, 1) }}
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{{ DREAD_score(2, 1, 1, 3, 1) }}
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<p>{% trans -%}
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These attacks aren't directly on the network, but instead go after its development team
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@@ -911,7 +911,7 @@ should any defense be necessary.
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<h3 id="impl">{% trans %}Implementation attacks (bugs){% endtrans %}</h3>
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{{ DREAD_score(1, 1, 1, 1, 1) }}
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{{ DREAD_score(2, 2, 1, 3, 1) }}
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<p>{% trans -%}
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Try as we might, most nontrivial applications include errors in the design or
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